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Small Hydroelectric Projects and State
Water Rights
A race to develop small scale hydroelectric projects has been
underway throughout the west during the last ten years.' The scramble
to find and develop sites has been described as the "gold rush of
the 80's,' '2 a "stampede," ' 3 a "tidal wave," '4 and "hydromania." 5
By whatever appellation, the interest in hydroelectric power has
caused renewed interest in federalism because the "hydromania" was
caused by federal incentives. 6 Because the states have elaborate sys-
tems to regulate water use,7 states prefer to regulate the water used
in making electricity. The circumstances under which a developer
may claim federal authority to supersede state law is the subject of
great debate.8
1. Thomas, Leacox & Farman, Federal Incentives for Hydroelectric Power Projects at
New Dams: FERC's Failure to Recognize Congressional Intent and Environmental Concerns,
18 U.S. DAvis L. Rv. 287, 288 (1984).
2. See Wolfe, Hydropower: FERC Licensing and Emerging State-Federal Water Rights
Conflicts, 29 RocKY MN. MiN. L. INsT. 851 (1983); Sacramento Bee, Oct. 7, 1986, at B1-Col. 1.
3. Sacramento Bee, Oct. 7, 1986, at BI, col. 1 (quoting state Assemblyman as saying
that the small power plant projects would damage and perhaps eliminate native trout and
recreational use on miles of virgin streams and parts of free flowing rivers).
4. Id. (representative of Independent Energy Producers Association said fear of tidal
wave of projects is overblown).
5. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 21, 1986, This World, at 15, col. 1 (environmentalists
who initially thought hydro was good energy alternative are now concerned about the effects
the projects have on sensitive undeveloped regions of California).
6. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) provided the majority of the incen-
tives. PURPA was part of President Carter's National Energy-Program. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42 & 43 U.S.C.).
7. See Position Statement of the Western States Water Council Prepared on Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission Licensing and State Water Rights (Apr. 22, 1983) (copy on
file at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as WSWC Position].
8. See, e.g., Comment, Hydroelectric Power, the Federal Power Act and State Water
Laws: Is Federal Preemption Water Over the Dam?, 17 U.C. DAvis L. Ray. 1179, 1206 (1984)
(federal preemption should not apply to state water laws).
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In reaction to the energy shortage in the United States in the
1970s9 Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act10
(PURPA) in 1978. One of the goals of PURPA was to expedite the
development of small hydroelectric power projects by providing an
exemption from the licensing requirements of the Federal Power Act"
(FPA). In the Energy Security Act of 198012 (ESA), Congress allowed
a further exemption from the licensing laws for small hydroelectric
projects.
The FPA 3 was enacted by Congress in 1920 to provide a compre-
hensive plan to improve the development of water power.' 4 The FPA
created the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 5 (FERC) to
administer the laws created for licensing the construction and oper-
ation of hydro projects. 16 As amended by PURPA and the ESA, the
FPA does not define the division of state and federal regulatory
authority over small hydroelectric development.' 7 Whether the federal
government exercises final authority over licensed projects with re-
spect to state water rights permits is a subject of controversy and
9. The energy crisis was precipitated by the imposition of an embargo on oil exports to
the United States by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973. The
oil embargo caused a sharp increase in the price of fossil fuels in the United States. One
commentator in 1981 stated: "In the face of rising prices and political instability in source
countries, reducing oil consumption has become a national mania." Burke, Small Scale
Hydroelectric Development and Federal Environmental Law: A Guide for the Private Devel-
oper, 9 B.C. Etrvm. Asp. L. Rav. 815, 815 (1981).
10. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15, 16, 30, 42 & 43 U.S.C.).
11. 16 U.S.C. 823a.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611, 718 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16 U.S.C.). The exemption for small hydropower projects under five megawatts is codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 2705(d) (1982).
13. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823a (1982) (codified as amended by Public Utility Act of 1935
and Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978). The FPA was originally the Federal Water
Power Act of 1920. 41 Stat. 1063 (1920).
14. Federal Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965).
The central purpose of the Federal Water Power Act was to provide for the
comprehensive control over those uses of the Nation's water resources in which the
Federal Government had a legitimate interest; these uses included navigation, irri-
gation, flood control, and, very prominently, hydroelectric power-uses which, while
unregulated, might well be contradictory rather than harmonious.
Id. at 98. But see Whittaker, The Federal Power Act and Hydropower Development: Redis-
covering State Regulatory Powers and Responsibilities 10 HARv. ENvTL. L. Rv. 135 (1986).
Whittaker argues that the Federal Water Power Act was a compromise between House members
who wanted to ensure that the nation's resources were not given away, and Senators who
wanted to ensure that state regulation of water would not be affected. Id. at 150-54.
15. The Federal Power Commission was renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission in 1977. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)
(1982).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-797 (1982).
17. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1184.
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current litigation. 8 The federal preemption doctrine 9 has been applied
to many projects licensed under the FPA, ° thus precluding much
state regulation of hydroelectric power. 2' The application of the
federal preemption doctrine to projects that are exempt from licensing
under federal statutory authority is also questionable.
22
The history and tradition of water law is marked by a federal
deference to state laws. 2 3 The arid western states manage their water
resources through complex schemes of water appropriation. 24 These
appropriative systems would be seriously jeopardized if preempted
by federal laws for the development of hydroelectric power. 2  In the
process of granting appropriative rights, the states must carefully
consider and balance a variety of uses and demands for water. 26 The
states should not have to subordinate those considerations to energy
creation alone.27
This comment will examine whether state law is preempted by
federal laws regulating hydroelectric projects that are exempt from
federal licensing requirements. The FPA and the basis for federal
18. Current litigation in California is Sayles Hydro Assoc. v. United States, No. CIVS-
86-0868 LKK (E.D. Ca. filed Dec. 19, 1986). See Sacramento Bee, Feb. 10, 1987, at B3, col.
5 (state assembly committee told state control of hydro imperiled).
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973).
20. E.g., City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958); Washington
Dept. of Game v. Federal Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 936 (1954); Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1982); Town
of Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd., 521 F. Supp. 243 (D. Vt. 1981).
21. See Statement of Assemblyman Byron Sher to the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) on Implementation of PURPA (Mar. 27, 1987) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Sher Statement].
22. See Small Hydro Program: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Energy Con-
servation and Power, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (letter from Raymond O'Connor, Chairman
of FERC, Sept. 11, 1984, answer to question C.3.a) [hereinafter cited as Small Hydro].
23. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).
24. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1205 (water rights systems of the west are carefully
designed to deliver water to the maximum number of users).
25. See Sher Statement, supra note 21. Since PURPA was enacted, 484 California projects
have applied for a license from FERC. Id.
Of these 484 projects, 268 have already received or applied for a water right permit
from the state. If the courts rule in favor of the developers in the Sayles Flat case,
the State's authority over these 268 projects would be effectively preempted and they
would be free to build without regard to state water rights or permit requirements.
This, I believe, would be a major disaster.
Id. (statement of Assemblyman Sher).
26. Trelease, Uneasy Federalism-State Water Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WASH.
L. Rav. 751, 752-55 (1980).
27. Note, Expanding Jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission and the Problem of
Federal-State Conflict, 18 VAN'm. L. Rav. 1847, 1857-60 (1965).
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regulation over hydro power will be examined first. 28 A review of
the PURPA amendments to the FPA will be discussed. 29 Next, the
comment will consider the controversy over the judicial interpreta-
tions of the FPA. 0 The importance of preserving appropriative water
rights systems will be discussed in light of current litigation." An
examination of the small power production facilities that are exempt
from federal licensing will follow. 32 The comment will then consider
the policies that support the preservation of state water law. 33 Since
some aspects of the FPA have recently changed, the Electric Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1986 will be mentioned.34 This comment
will conclude that federal preemption should not apply to the water rights
of small projects and in particular should not apply to small projects
that are exempt from licensing laws.35
THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
A. History
The Federal Power Act 36 (FPA) was enacted to promote the private
development of hydroelectric power within the bounds of federal
regulations. 37 Congress has the authority to protect the navigable
waters of the nation under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. 38 Congressional power to regulate commerce has under-
gone great expansion since the enactment of the FPA and therefore
the reach of federal authority to regulate hydroelectric power is far
more extensive than when the FPA was enacted. 39
28. See infra text accompanying notes 36-68.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 69-92.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 93-140.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 141-68.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 169-223.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 224-51.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 242-51.
35. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1207 n.136.
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-828(c) (1982). Part I of the Federal Power Act includes the
Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as amended by the Public Utility
Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1982)).
37. See generally Whittaker, supra note 14, at 153; Comment, States' Rights in Hydroe-
lectric Development: The Interrelation Between California Water Law and Section 27 of the
Federal Power Act, 18 U.S.F. L. Ray. 535, 539-40 (1984).
38. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The property clause also gives Congress jurisdiction over
hydroelectric projects. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
39. See Debevoise, The Role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Licensing
Small Hydroelectric Projects, 5 VT. L. REv. 279, 280 (1980); Whittaker, supra note 14, at
145-46. The discrepancies between judicial interpretations of Federal Water Power Act and
legislative history of the act arise from the difference between the limited navigation servitude
and the presently expansive congressional power to affirmatively regulate water resources. Id.
1228
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In the beginning of the twentieth century, technological
advancements 4° made possible the development of hydroelectric power
on a large scale. 41 Large private interests began claiming the hydroe-
lectric sites on major rivers. To protect the federal interest in the
navigable waters of the nation, Congress started to regulate the
industry.42 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 ensured that dams
could not be constructed on navigable waters without the approval
of Congress. 43 A developer of hydroelectric power had to obtain a
private bill from Congress to construct and operate a project. 44 The
General Dam Act, 45 enacted in 1906, specified the conditions that
would attach to all federally approved projects. 6
As the hydroelectric industry grew, only a few developers were
able to obtain congressional authorization to develop hydroelectric
power.47 Private bills allowing development of power sites did not
adequately protect the water resources of the nation.l These bills
were often nothing more than congressional approval to occupy
valuable dam sites in perpetuity at no charge.49 Conservationists
advocated legislation to regulate the use of the dam sites by limiting
the period of use and to impose charges for use of the sites.5 0
In the early 1900s, charging for the privilege of developing water
power was not clearly authorized under the commerce power.5 1 The
threatened imposition of charges sparked a serious debate in Congress
regarding the proper division of authority between the states and the
federal government.5 2 States' rights advocates maintained that the
40. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1207, 1217 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (alternating current made long distance transmission of power efficient).
41. See generally Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Water Power Legislation, 14
GEo. WA sH. L. REv. 9 (1945); Comment, supra note 37, at 538.
42. Chemehuevi Tribe, 489 F.2d at 1217.
43. 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982)). See Act of Mar. 3,
1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121.
44. Id.
45. Pub. L. No. 59-262, 34 Stat. 386 (1906).
46. Id. §§ 1, 3, 34 Stat. 386 (1906). Among the conditions were approval by the Secretary
of War and the Chief of Engineers of the plans, specifications, and locations of projects. The
developers could be required to construct navigation facilities and establish fishways. Id.
47. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 98 n.11 (1965);
Chemehuevi Tribe, 489 F.2d at 1219 n.54; Comment, supra note 37, at 538.
48. Chemehuevi Tribe, 489 F.2d at 1225.
49. Comment, supra note 37, at 538.
50. Id. at 539. The conservationists, who fought for regulation of the hydroelectric power
industry, saw the fight as one to stop the "great giveaway of the nation's resources." Id. at
538.
51. Chemehuevi Tribe, 489 F.2d at 1219. See also Whittaker, supra note 14, at. 150
(excellent review of the history of the FPA).
52. Chemehuevi Tribe, 489 F.2d at 1220 n.61; Whittaker, supra note 14, at 150-53.
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federal government could not charge for the use of the water to
create electricity because water had been traditionally controlled by
the states. 53 The states feared that the federal use charges would
ensure federal preemption of all state water laws.5 4 The agreement
reached by Congress replaced the use charge with a charge to cover
only the cost of processing the licenses,55 thereby maintaining the
authority of the states to regulate the water within their boundaries. 56
In 1920 the compromise charge provision was incorporated into the
Federal Water Power Act,57 as one of the conditions placed on a
federal license to develop hydroelectric power.58
Through the regulations enacted pursuant to the FPA, Congress
sought to promote private development of hydroelectric power while
retaining control over the navigable waters of the nation. 9 During
the debates that led to the adoption of the FPA, the states voiced
two primary concerns. First, the states wanted to promote hydroe-
lectric development 0 Second, they sought to maintain control of
water distribution and appropriation. 61 Congress attempted to balance
the traditional rights of states to regulate water with the federal
authority to regulate navigation under the commerce power. 62 Thus,
section 9(b) of the FPA requires an applicant to submit satisfactory
evidence that state law pertaining to the use of water for power
purposes has been satisfied. 63 Section 27 reserves to the states their
authority over the regulation of water 4
The FPA established the general principle of federal regulation of
water power projects by clearly regulating the construction and
53. Whittaker, supra note 14, at 151. The objection to the charge provision was that "it
is wholly inequitable and unjust to compel parties who are building dams with their own
money and without expense to the Government to pay compensation to the federal government
for property that belongs to a state." Id. at 150 (quoting Senator Nelson). "The corpus of a
water resource, including its potential to produce power, remained in the trusteeship of the
individual states, to be allocated according to their own freely adopted regulatory systems."
Id. at 151.
54. Id. at 150.
55. Id. at 152-53.
56. Id.
57. 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823a (1982)). The charge provision
is found at 16 U.S.C. § 803(e) (1982). See Debevoise, supra note 39, at 280.
58. The license term is limited to 50 years. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1982).
59. Comment, supra note 37, at 539.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The preface to the Act states that it was "to provide for the improvement in navigation;
the develQpment of water power; the use of public lands in relation thereto ... and for other
purposes." 41 Stat. 1063 (1920).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1982).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1982).
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operation of hydroelectric facilities.6 5 The Act created the Federal
Power Commission 6 and gave the Commission jurisdiction over
projects, located on federal lands or navigable streams, that affect
interstate commerce. 67 Proposed projects that fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission cannot be built unless the developer obtains
a license or an exemption from FERC. 68
B. PURPA and the Energy Crisis
The FPA was amended in 197869 and 198070 to encourage the
production of energy through the development of small hydroelectric
projects. 71 As a result of the OPEC oil embargo,7 2 Congress adopted
legislation to encourage domestic power production. 73 PURPA
amended the FPA to provide incentives to stimulate domestic power
produced through renewable resources. 74 The PURPA incentives pro-
duced a dramatic increase in the number of applications filed to
develop small hydroelectric power projects. 75
PURPA requires electric utilities to offer to buy energy produced
by "qualifying facilities ' 76 at a rate not to exceed "the incremental
65. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1207, 1223 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
66. Congress reorganized the FPC as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
in 1977. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 583
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1) (1982)).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1982). See Federal Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S.
90 (1965). In Union Electric, the Court held that "commerce" referred not only to commerce
on navigable waters, but to the nonnavigable headwaters of a navigable river. Id. at 96-98.
Union Electric also established that the production of power that moves interstate, affects
interstate commerce in electricity. This interpretation gives FERC a jurisdictional basis to
license practically all hydro projects. Id. at 94. But see City of Centralia v. Federal Energy
Reg. Comm'n, 661 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1981) (effect on interstate commerce must be real and
substantial).
68. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 817 (1982). The Commission makes an initial determination whether
a proposal falls within its jurisdiction. Id. § 817.
69. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L, No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
70. Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980).
71. Idaho Power Co. v. Federal Energy Comm'n, 766 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Congress believed that encouraging "qualifying projects" under PURPA would reduce coun-
try's demand for fossil fuels).
72. See supra note 9.
73. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978);
Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980).
74. PURPA did not define "renewable resource" but the conference report designated
water as a renewable resource. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnN. NEWS 7797, 7823.
75. See infra text accompanying note 86. See also Fenn, Renewable Power Generation:
Beyond the Shakeout, PuB. UTr. FORT., Nov. 10, 1986, at 27.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A) (1982). A small power production facility is defined as a
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cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.' ' The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) interprets this language to
mean that the incremental cost should be the utility's "full avoided
cost," 78 which is the cost the utility company would pay to use the
next best source of power. 79 By providing a guaranteed buyer for
producers of small hydroelectric power, the regulation artificially
creates economic viability.80 Other incentives such as a five-year
depreciation schedule8 and investment tax credits of twenty-one
percent8 2 were available through the end of 1985.
To expedite the development of small hydroelectric projects, PURPA
and the Energy Security Act (ESA) provide two categories of hy-
droelectric projects that are exempt from the licensing requirements
of the FPA.8 3 PURPA exempts hydroelectric projects that produce
power by the placement of a turbine in an existing manmade water
conveyance such as a pipe or a canal.8 4 The ESA exemption applies
to projects that produce power by placing the necessary generating
equipment at an existing dam or diversion.'
The incentives have been so successful in encouraging the devel-
opment of small hydroelectric power projects that the total number
facility that produces electric energy from biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal
resources, or a combination thereof. Id. § 796(17)(A)(i). The small power facility must also
have a power production capacity which is not greater than eighty megawatts. Id. at §
796(17)(A)(ii).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1982).
78. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2)-(4) (1986).
79. Id. See also American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S.
402 (1983) (the Supreme Court upheld FERC's interpretation of the regulation).
80. See Wolfe, supra note 2, at 853. See also Sher Statement, supra note 21. Sher states
that California faces an oversupply of energy and if a substantial number of the alternative
energy projects come on line, these projects will displace cheaper, existing sources of power.
Sher also relates the perception that the hydropower projects will enrich private entrepreneurs
at the expense of ratepayers. Id.
81. 26 U.S.C. § 168 (1982).
82. 26 U.S.C. §§ 46, 48()(2)(A)(vii), 480)(13) (1982).
83. 16 U.S.C. §§ 823a (1982) (exemption for small conduit facilities), 2705(d) (1982)
(exemptions for small hydroelectric power projects having proposed installed capacity of five
megawatts or less). See Idaho Power Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 766 F.2d 1348,
1350 (9th Cir. 1985) (exemptions provided as part of scheme to encourage certain hydroelectric
projects by reducing some start-up and operating costs).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 823a (1982) (exemption applies to projects with a maximum installed
capacity of 15 megawatts; 40 megawatt capacity allowed if the conduit provides municipal
water supply).
85. Id. § 2705(d) (1982) (exemption only applies to projects that have no more than five
megawatts of energy generating capacity). "One megawatt is generally sufficient to supply the
average electrical needs (including industrial needs) of 500 people or the domestic-residential
needs of 1,000 people." Burke, supra note 9, at 845 n.208.
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of applications filed for preliminary permits, exemptions, and licenses
increased from 79 in 1977 to 2,363 in 1981.86 Exempt projects
represent a significant portion of current hydro power development. 87
The dramatic proliferation of small hydroelectric projects has, how-
ever, created increased demands on limited resources . 88
The increased number of small hydroelectric projects spawned by
PURPA has created conflicts between the states and the federal
government over the regulation of water rights, 89 and has generally
intensified the debate over federalism. 90 The FPA appeared to create
a system in which the federal government maintained authority over
the development of hydroelectric power, while leaving the regulation
of water to the states. 91 The two sections of the FPA which purported
to protect state interests were interpreted by the Supreme Court in
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commis-
sion.92 Since First Iowa, the courts have held that the federal gov-
ernment has exclusive control over the licensing of hydroelectric
projects.
86. Small Hydro, supra note 22 (letter from FERC chairman, answer to question C.3.a).
87. Burke, supra note 9, at 846 n.216. FERC estimated in 1981 that between 20% and
75% of developable hydroelectric power falls within the exemptions. Id.
88. See Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming the Federal Role in Hydropower
Licensing, 10 HAzv. ENVTL. L. Rav. 1, 3 (1986). Blumn describes much of the criticism
FERC has received for ignoring the adverse effects of many of the projects on important
national resources. He suggests that FERC was simply unable to handle the flood of appli-
cations given the structure of their bureaucracy, the small number of staff, and their formal
procedures. He relates the belief of environmentalists that FERC's regulation of hydropower
development does not reflect the public interest, as demonstrated by the many lawsuits filed
challenging FERC decisions. Id. at 2-5.
89. See generally Small Hydro, supra note 22; Wolfe, supra note 2, at 867-79.
90. See generally Arnold, Emerging Possibilities for State Control of Hydroelectric De-
velopment, 13 Ei~rvL. L. REP. 10,135, 10,143 (1983) (states should be encouraged to assert
their interests aggressively in the regulation and control of hydro development); Blumm, supra
note 88, at 6 (FERC's discretion to regulate hydroelectric development has been curbed by
recent cases, but fundamental reform needed in regulatory system); Plouffe, Forty Years After
First Iowa: A Call for Greater State Control of River Resources, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 833,
833 (1986) (federal government's preemptive power should be reexamined to allow for state
comprehensive river plans); Whittaker, supra note 14, at 138 (states have regulatory respon-
sibilities to determine the best uses of water resources); Wolfe, supra note 2, at 896 (states
are in a better position than the federal government to determine the issues of water use
essential to hydro development); Comment, supra note 8, at 1185 (congressional intent for
states to retain authority to regulate water should be recognized in licensing hydroelectric
projects); Comment, supra note 37, at 537 (arguing that state water law is not displaced by
FPA); Comment, Regulation of Hydro-Electric Development: State v. Federal Control, 2 PuB.
LANm L. Ray. 109, 121-22 (1981) (conflict between resource rich states and plenary power
over hydroelectric facility siting).
91. 16 U.S.C. §§ 802(b), 821 (1982).
92. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Commission
In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Com-
mission,93 the Supreme Court held that the dual licensing procedures
required by the state and the federal government under the FPA
would be unworkable. 94 The Federal Power Commission refused to
issue a license for construction of a water project because the
applicant did not demonstrate compliance with an Iowa statute
regulating construction, operation, and maintenance of a dam. 9 The
Court stated that the FPA established a dual system of control but
the system did not give both the states and the federal government
final authority over the same issue. 96 A duplicative system that
required "conformity to both standards would be impossible in some
cases and probably difficult in most of them." 97
The Court in First Iowa construed the meaning of section 9(b) of
the FPA.98 Section 9(b) requires an applicant for a federal license to
submit evidence of compliance with applicable state laws. 99 The Court
held that section 9(b) did not require an applicant for a federal
license to obtain a state permit as a condition precedent to obtaining
a federal license.'00 The Supreme Court reasoned that requiring an
applicant to obtain a state permit could destroy the effectiveness of
the FPA by giving the state a veto power over the project. 1 1 The
Court stated that the detailed provisions of the federal regulatory
plan did not leave room for conflicting state controls. 02 The reference
to state laws in section 9(b) merely suggested that compliance with
93. Id.
94. Id. at 168.
95. Id. at 161.
96. Id. at 167-68.
97. Id. at 168.
98. Id. at 168-82.
99. Id. 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1982). The applicant for a license must submit "[s]atisfactory
evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State or
States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and
to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes .... " Id.
100. 328 U.S. 152, 170 (1946).
101. Id. at 164.
102. Id. at 181. When state law conflicts with a federal law, the state law must yield under
the supremacy clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV., § 2.
1234
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state laws is required only when the Commission deems compliance
necessary. 103 The First Iowa Court also interpreted section 27 nar-
rowly. Section 27, the savings clause section of the Act, provides
that the states retain regulatory responsibility over water. 1s While
the Court stated that the section protected state laws relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water, the opinion
limited section 27 to the protection of proprietary rights. 105 Thus, the
Court construed section 27 as a savings clause that provides for
compensation in the event of destruction of water rights.e 6 While
the Supreme Court held that the FPA did not give the federal
government complete control over hydro power development, the
states have had a limited regulatory role since First Iowa.0 7
As commentators have noted, 10 the Supreme Court has never
directly considered whether section 27 of the Federal Power Act
permits preemption of state laws regarding the appropriation of
water. 09 First Iowa did not resolve the water rights issue because the
developer possessed enough riparian rights to operate the project.110
Riparian rights are rights to the water resulting from the ownership
of land that borders a waterway."' Appropriative rights, on the other
103. First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 181. The reference to state laws was "by way of suggestion
to the Federal Power Commission of subjects as to which the Commission may wish some
proof submitted to it of the applicant's progress." Id. at 177-78.
104. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1982).
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or
in.any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control,
appropriation; use or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or
other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.
Id.
105. First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 176. The court stated that § 27 "expressly 'saves' certain
state laws relating to property rights as to the use of water" from preemption by the Federal
Power Act. Id. at 175.
106. Id. at 176-77. See infra notes 108-18 (arguing that the Court's construction of § 27
may only be dicta).
107. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958) (city permitted to
condemn state land for hydro project); Washington Dept. of Game v. Federal Power Comm'n,
207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954) (state statute and voter initiative
preempted); Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1982) (state statute
requiring certificate of public good prior to construction of hydroelectric project preempted
by FPA); Town of Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd., 521 F. Supp. 243 (D. Vt. 1981)
(applicant permitted to violate state land use laws). See also Plouffe, supra note 90, at 838-
42.
108. Comment, supra note 8, at 1197 n.91; Comment, supra note 37, at 537.
109. Id. See also State Board's Opening Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Sayles Hydro Assoc. v. United States, No. CIVS-86-
0868 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed July 21, 1986) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as State Board].
110. First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 158; State Board, supra note 109.
111. F. TRamEASE & G. GOULD, WATER LAW (1986).
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hand, depend specifically upon terms granted by the state for these
rights.112 Because appropriative rights were not involved in First Iowa,
section 27 of the FPA was not necessary to decide the case."' The
narrow issue before the Court in First Iowa"4 was whether section
9(b) compelled compliance with the terms of the Iowa Mills, Dams,
and Races statute.115 The Court drew a distinction between state
water laws, which are saved by section 27, and state laws that regulate
the construction and operation of hydro projects." 6 Since no issue
of state water law was before the court, the interpretation of section
27 of the FPA in First Iowa is merely dicta." 7 Therefore, the
application of state appropriative water laws would not be barred by
First Iowa."1
Theoretically, states can regulate aspects of hydroelectric projects
that do not conflict with the federal regulations or represent a veto
power over the federal program.1 9 In practice, however, there are
few ways to regulate hydro projects after First Iowa that do not
112. Position of the WSWC, supra note 7.
Under the appropriation doctrine water is declared the property of the state or
public. The essence of the creation of an appropriative water right is application of
the water to be a legislatively defined beneficial use. The right, allowing continued
beneficial use, is then protected against subsequent appropriations. Application of
this principle promotes stability of existing economies predicated upon water use and
insures maximum beneficial use as defined by the public.
Id.
113. First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 166.
114. Id. at 162-63.
115. Id. at 165-66.
When permit granted. If it shall appear to the council that the construction,
operation, or maintenance of the dam will not materially obstruct existing navigation,
or materially affect other public rights, will not endanger life or public health, and
any water taken from the stream in connection with the project is returned thereto
at the nearest practicable place without being materially diminished in quantity or
polluted or rendered deleterious to fish life, it shall grant the permit, upon such
terms and conditions as it may prescribe.
Id. (quoting IowA CODE § 7771 (1939)).
116. Id. at 175-76.
117. Comment, supra note 37, at 545; State Board, supra note 109.
118. State Board, supra note 109. But see Plaintiff's Points and Authorities in Opposition
to States's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Sayles Hydro Assoc. v. United States, No. CIVS-86-0868 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed
Dec. 19, 1986) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment]. The interpretation of § 27 in First Iowa should not be considered
dicta because the distinction between an appropriative right statute and the Iowa statute is
without substance. The Iowa statute before the Court was similar to a law concerning
appropriation of water. Even though the precise issue facing the Court was the effect of §
9(b), the discussion of § 27 was necessary to determine if the challenged state action fell within
the "savings proviso" of § 27. Therefore, the discussion of the section was an integral aspect
of the case. Id.
119. First Iowa, 328 U.S. 152, 178 (1946).
1236
1987 / Small Hydroelectric Projects
represent a conflict with the federal scheme.120 If state water rights
laws are deemed to be precluded by the FPA, the role of a state
water agency could be limited to determining whether available water
exists. 21
Regulation of water rights has traditionally been an area the federal
government has left to state control. 22 While First Iowa set the
precedent for federal preemption of most state laws relating to hydro
power, the decision did not resolve whether state water laws are
preempted by the FPA. m The legislative history of the FPA supports
an argument that Congress intended the states to retain the right to
control water use. 2 A recent case from the United States Supreme
Court, California v. United States,-5 strongly supports the power of
states to regulate water rights.
B. California v. United States
In California v. United States, respect for state water laws was
demonstrated in the context of the Reclamation Act.126 California v.
United States concerned the New Melones Dam,"27 a dam built in
California under the Reclamation Act. 28 The Bureau of Reclamation
applied for a water right permit from the state and was granted a
permit subject to various conditions. 129 The United States sought a
120. See supra note 107.
121. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Sayles Hydro Assoc. v. United
States, No. CIVS-86-0868 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed July 21, 1986) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Complaint]. Determining only water availability would be a
significant limitation on the state role. See infra text accompanying notes 141-52.
122. See generally California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
123. Comment, supra note 37, at 546. No court passed judgment on the interrelationship
of state water laws and the FPA. In Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, the Court allowed alicensed project to proceed without the appropriate state water permit. The project, however,
was located on federal land reserved for power purposes. 349 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1955). Thepresently pending litigation in California is similar in this respect. Sayles Hydro Assoc. v.United States, No. CIVS-86-0868 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 19, 1986).
124. See Statement by David Kennedy, Director of California Department of Water
Resources, before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate(Sept. 12, 1986) (Congress clearly intended deference to the substance and procedure of state
law) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy Statement]; State
Board, supra, note 109 (extensive legislative history to support state regulation of water).
125.- 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600e (1982).
129. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 652. For example, water collection was
prohibited until the Bureau showed a specific plan for use of the water. The state also required
a preference be given to water users in the local water basin. Storage releases were providedfor the maintenance of fish and wildlife and the State Board reserved jurisdiction to impose
further conditions if necessary to protect the beneficial use of the water. Id. at 653 n.8.
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declaratory judgment that the federal government could impound
whatever unappropriated water necessary without compliance with
state laws.130 The Court held that the state may impose conditions
that are not inconsistent with federal directives regarding the New
Melones Dam project.' 3' The holding of the Court was based on the
meaning of section 8 of the Reclamation Act. 32
The language of section 8 is virtually identical to that of section
27 of the FPA. 33 Section 8 had previously been construed by the
courts as providing compensation only for loss of property rights.
3 4
The Supreme Court dismissed the prior interpretations as dicta and
held that under section 8 the Secretary of the Interior must comply
with state laws as to the appropriation, purchase, or condemnation
of water rights. 35 The Court found that Congress intended to preserve
state power to regulate the distribution and appropriation of water.
36
This decision can be used to interpret section 27 of the FPA
because section 8 of the Reclamation Act was used as a model for
section 27. 37 Moreover, the Court in First Iowa pointed to the
similarity of purpose and language in concluding that both sections
should be construed in the same manner. 38 The disavowal of the
prior interpretations of the Reclamation Act savings clause in Cali-
130. Id. at 647.
131. Id. at 674.
132. Id. at 675.
133. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1976). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act states:
Nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any
way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right
acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions
of this act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws...
Id. Compare § 8 of the Reclamation Act with § 27 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 821, supra note
104.
134. City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275 (1958).
135. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 672-75. The Court said:
Section 8 cannot be read to require the Secretary to comply with state law only
when it becomes necessary to purchase or condemn vested water rights .... Nor,
as the United States contends, does § 8 merely require the Secretary of the Interior
to file a notice with the State of his intent to appropriate but to thereafter ignore
the substantive provisions of state law. The legislative history of the Reclamation
Act of 1902 makes it abundantly clear that Congress intended to defer to the
substance, as well as the form, of state water law. The Government's interpretation
would trivialize the broad language and purpose of section 8.
Id. at 674-75.
136. Id. at 675.
137. State Board, supra note 109; Kennedy Statement, supra note 124; see also Comment,
supra note 37, at 551.
138. First Iowa Hydro-EIec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 176 n.20
(1946).
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fornia v. United States should likewise be extended to section 27 of
the Federal Power Act.'39 While a narrower interpretation of section
27 may be justified by the different context of the FPA, section 27
should be reconsidered in light of the expansive scope given the
savings clause in California v. United States.140 To understand why
a broad interpretation of section 27 is so important to the states, an
examination of an appropriative rights system is required.
STATE WATER RiGHrs
The doctrine of prior appropriation is used in most western states
to maximize the use of water and provide certainty of water distri-
bution to individual users. 141 Appropriative rights, granted by the
state, are specific rights to use a certain amount of water for a
particular purpose. 42 Before an appropriation is granted, the state
must determine that unappropriated water is available, that the use
is a beneficial use 43 and that the grant of an appropriative permit
is in the public interest.' 4 The public interest consideration is a very
important means by which the states balance competing values to
achieve efficient water use. 145 The permit process incorporates state
policy with a highly complex distribution system and allows a state
to choose water uses which produce the greatest societal benefits. 4 6
Under California law, the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) reviews all water right applications to determine water
availability and consistency with the public interest. 4 7 The evaluation
of the public interest requires that recreation, fish, wildlife, and
environmental values be given consideration.'" The permit process is
critical to hydroelectric development because through the appropri-
ative permit the state can promote power use while protecting vested
139. See Whittaker, supra note 14, at 176; Comment, supra note 37, at 551.
140. Whittaker, supra note 14 at 176 (identical purpose of such savings clauses; California
v. United States emphasized broad purpose of saving clauses is to fully protect state water
law systems).
141. Trelease, supra note 26, at 752-55.
142. F. TREIEASE & G. GoULD, WATER LAW 13 (1986).
143. Cal. Water Code § 100 (West 1971).
144. Trelease, supra note 26, at 752-55.
145. Id. at 754.
146. Id.
147. CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 1971). The evaluation of the public interest involves
consideration of a wide scope of environmental values. Id. §§ 1243, 1257. Additionally, the
California Constitution requires that all uses of water be reasonable and beneficial. CAL.
CoN sT. art. X, § 2. The requirements under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
must also be met. CAL. Pu. Rs. CODE §§ 21100-21176 (Vest 1986).
148. CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (1971).
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rights, future water development, and environmental values. 149 If
state water law is ignored by the federal promotion of hydroelectric
power, the legitimate state interest in protecting property rights and
planning future development through an appropriative water rights
system could be threatened. 150 Numerous disruptive effects of dam-
ming or diverting water for hydroelectric power projects are
recognized'-" and can be addressed by means of the appropriative
permit procedure. 5 2
Developers of small hydroelectric projects generally seek to im-
pound as much water as possible in order to maximize the electricity
production. 153 Unregulated impoundment could have serious effects
on downstream water users by reducing the amount of water avail-
able.15 4 Even small hydro projects that do not impound water but
instead operate as "run of the river" projects could have deleterious
effects on state water systems if unregulated. Many small projects in
the western mountains are run of the river projects that take advan-
tage of the steep mountain slopes. 55 This type of project diverts
water into a pipe known as a penstock, runs the water down the
mountainside to the turbine and generator, then returns the water to
the stream. 56 By controlling the diversion of water into the penstock,
a state can protect the rights of those users of water who are between
the point of diversion and the point of return to the stream.1
57
A current case in California, Sayles Hydro Associates v. United
States, 51 demonstrates the conflict between the states and the federal
government over the division of regulatory authority over hydroelec-
tric power projects. A hydroelectric facility was licensed by FERC
for a site close to Highway 50, on a scenic stretch of the south fork
of the American River. 59 The project has drawn the attention of
149. Id.
150. Trelease, supra note 26, at 757.
151. Whittaker, supra note 14, at 135; Comment, supra note 8, at 1206.
152. CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971).
153. Comment, supra note 8, at 1206.
154. Id.
155. Id. See also Sher Statement, supra note 21 (run of the river projects can dewater
streams, destroy fishery habitat, block spawning access, and impair navigable streams). Id.
156. Comment, supra note 8, at 1206.
157. Id. Additionally, the state appropriation system can provide future upstream devel-
opment by means of subordination. Subordination allows the state to grant a permit for hydro
power without foreclosing future preferred uses. CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (West 1971). The
state system also protects required instream flows. CAL. WATER CODE § 1250.5 (West Supp.
1987).
158. Sayles Hydro Assoc. v. United States, No. CIVS-86-0868 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed Dec.
19, 1986).
159. Id.
1240
1987 / Small Hydroelectric Projects
state legislators, cabin owners, fishermen, and environmentalists among
others.'6° The private developer is challenging the requirement of an
appropriative permit from the state, claiming that First Iowa is
dispositive of the issue.1
6
'
The hydroelectric developer maintains that the state is preempted
by the FPA and cannot compel duplicative requirements. 62 The
developer contends that the role of the SWRCB is limited to deter-
mining whether there is sufficient unappropriated water to operate
the project without injury to vested rights. 63 The developer claims
that the environmental requirements for the appropriative permit are
not property rights protected under section 27, as analyzed in First
Iowa.164
The State Board maintains First Iowa does not mandate preemption
of the state water right permit because California v. United States
compels a "reconsideration of the broad dicta contained in First
Iowa regarding a hydroelectric power licensee's obligation to comply
with State water right law.' ' 6 The state argues that the holding of
California v. United States should control because the appropriative
permit process that was upheld with regard to New Melones Dam is
the same process that must be used for this hydroelectric facility.!6s
The broad purpose of a savings clause is to protect state water law
systems, 67 and section 27 should be recognized as preserving state
regulation of water rights for hydroelectric projects. 68
EXEMPTIONS FROM FEDERAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
While most state laws regarding hydroelectric projects have been
preempted by the FPA, federal preemption of state laws may not
apply to projects that are exempt from the licensing requirements. 69
160. See Sher Statement, supra note 21; Sacramento Bee, Feb. 10, 1987, at B3, col. 5.
161. Complaint, supra note 121. But see Sher Statement, supra note 21. Sher states: "if
the plaintiffs in the Sayles Flat case prevail, I fear it will establish an extremely bad precedent
for more than 200 hydro projects previously licensed by FERC but still awaiting water right
permits." Id. at 5.
162. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 118.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. State Board, supra note 109.
166. Id.
167. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 675 (1978). See supra text accompanying
notes 133-40 (discussion of similarity of language and purpose of § 8 of the Reclamation Act
and § 27 of the FPA).
168. State Board, supra note 109.
169. This lack of clarity is demonstrated by the fact that some hydropower developers
maintain this position regarding federal preemption. See Arnold, supra note 90, at 10,142.
But cf. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 880 n.112.
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Neither the courts nor the Commission has had occasion to address
this issue. 170 The legislative histories of the acts do not resolve the
issue either. The only clear message is that Congress intended to
expedite the development of certain qualifying hydroelectric proj-
ects. 171
If FERC has jurisdiction over a proposed hydroelectric project,
but the project does not qualify for an exemption, the developer
must file a declaration of intent to construct and operate a hydroe-
lectric facility' 72 and an application for a preliminary permit is
required. 173 The subsequent procedure for licensing the project de-
pends on the type and size of the project. 174 A license applicant for
a large project 75 must supply FERC with a considerable amount of
detailed information and particularly rigorous environmental disclo-
sure requirements. 176 The application for an exemption from licensing
requires less information and is easier to satisfy than a license
application. '77
Two categories of projects are exempt from licensing require-
ments. 78 Section 213 of PURPA provides that certain small conduit 79
hydroelectric projects of fifteen megawatts' 0 or less may be exempt
from licensing requirements.' 8' Qualifying projects must be located
170. Small Hydro, supra note 22 (statement by FERC Chairman, in answer to question
1.9).
171. S. REP. No. 141, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 7796-97 (PURPA); S. REP. No. 166, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2172 (ESA).
172. 16 U.S.C. § 817 (1982).
173. 16 U.S.C. §§ 798, 800 (1982).
174. 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.30-4.84 (1986).
175. 18 C.F.R. § 4.40 (1986) (large project defined as having over five megawatts of
installed capacity).
176. Id. § 4.41 (1986). The contents of the application for a major project include: a very
detailed description of the project, a statement of project operation and resources utilization,
a proposed construction schedule, an environmental report that includes 11 subsections enum-
erating reports that must be filed in addition to general descriptions, and general design
drawings. Id. But see Sher Statement, supra note 21. Because FERC has never formally cited
an operator for license violations, there is no reason to believe that FERC can or will
adequately regulate the projects. Id.
177. See id. §§ 4.40-4.108 (1986).
178. 16 U.S.C. §§ 823a, 2705(d) (1982).
179. Id. § 823(a)-(d) (1982). A "conduit" is "any tunnel, canal, pipeline, aqueduct, flume,
ditch, or similar manmade water conveyance that is operated for the distribution of water for
agricultural, municipal, or industrial consumption and not primarily for the generation of
electricity." 18 C.F.R. § 4.30(b)(2) (1986).
180. Congress recently increased the installed capacity of these conduit facilities to 40
megawatts, provided the conduit is used solely for municipal water supply. Pub. L. No. 99-
495, § 7(a), 100 Stat. 1248 (1986).
181. 16 U.S.C. § 823a (1982).
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on nonfederal lands and must use a manmade water conduit that is
operated primarily for nonhydroelectric uses.'8 2 The second exemption
category, created by the Energy Security Act of 1980 (ESA), applies
to projects with a capacity of five megawatts or less which utilize an
existing dam or natural water feature. 83
The exemption provided under the ESA is the principal exemption
used by hydro developers 184 and it is also the more significant of the
two exemptions because it motivates the development of projects on
natural bodies of water.' 85 According to the legislative history of the
ESA, the natural water feature provision was meant to apply to sites
where there is no need for a dam or an impoundment structure.'
6
FERC defined a natural water feature to include "diversion structures
up to ten feet, impounding less than two acre-feet of water, and not
increasing natural hydraulic head by more than five percent.'
' 87
FERC's liberal interpretation of a natural water feature was struck
down in Tulalip Tribes v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ss
as being contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.'89 FERC,
therefore, could not grant exemptions for new dams or impound-
ments.'90
The Tulalip court held that Congress wanted not only to expedite
the development of small hydroelectric projects but also to protect
the environment by confining exemptions to existing dams and im-
poundments.' 9' This interpretation was recently reinforced by Con-
gress in the Electric Consumer Protection Act of 198692 (ECPA).
The ECPA clearly provides that the PURPA benefits do not apply
182. Id. The small conduit exemption does not present many conflicts, as the placement
of a turbine in existing conduits does not effect many changes in the environment or water
systems.
183. Id. § 2705(d) (1982); 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.101-4.113 (1986).
184. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 865.
185. 16 U.S.C. § 2705(d) (1982). Compare id. with 16 U.S.C. § 823a (1982) (exemption
for manmade conduit).
186. Tulalip Tribes v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 732 F.2d 1451, 1454-55 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 270 (1985) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1104, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
276, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm4. NEws 2077, 2171).
187. Id. at 1454-55. See Blumm, supra note 88, at 12.
188. 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1984).
189. Id. at 1455. The court held that interpreting dam and impoundment according to
their plain meanings will not frustrate congressional intent to expedite and encourage devel-
opment of small hydro projects. Id.
190. Id. Interpreting the inconclusive legislative history of § 2708(b), the court stated that
the natural water feature exemption is limited to projects that will not have adverse effects on
such natural water features as water flow and water level. Id.
191. Id.
192. Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986).
1243
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
to any project involving a new dam or diversion unless there are no
substantial adverse effects on the environment. 93 In addition, the
project must not be located on a protected river, and must meet the
terms and conditions set by fish and wildlife agencies .94 The ECPA
reinforced the proposition that PURPA and the ESA provide ex-
emption procedures in order to accelerate the development of hy-
droelectric projects that have minimal effects on the environment. 19-
During congressional hearings on small hydroelectric projects, the
Chairman of FERC stated that in his opinion issuance of an exemp-
tion preempts some state regulatory action. 96 Exempt projects are
removed from the powers under part I of the FPA, which means
that "exemptees do not possess the power of Federal eminent do-
main."1 97 Federal law, therefore, does not preempt state property
law with respect to the acquisition of existing land and water rights.198
The Chairman, however, further maintained that the exemptions
were authorized in order to expedite the development of hydroelectric
power and that purpose could be "significantly hampered" by the
imposition of state requirements. ' 99
The Chairman appears to be saying that the exemptions are ex-
emptions for some purposes and expedited licenses for other pur-
poses. If the exemptions represent a short form of licensing, then
exempt projects should arguably enjoy the same federal protection
from state interference that licensed projects have pursuant to the
commerce power of the Congress. 200 FERC has jurisdiction over the
exempt projects that affect interstate commerce through the produc-
tion of electricity and projects that might interfere with the navigable
waters of the United States. 20 ' Since most projects will meet the
expansive commerce power test, FERC would have jurisdiction.
The fact that FERC may have jurisdiction over exempt projects
does not, however, mean that state laws will necessarily be preempted
by the FPA. In preemption analysis, the courts are principally
193. Id. at § 8(a), 100 Stat. 1243, 1249 (1986).
194. Id.
195. Id. This recent act provided that "a State has the authority to protect a waterway
from projects built with PURPA incentives if, in the State's determination, the waterway
would be adversely impacted by such development." H.R. 934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986).
196. Small Hydro, supra note 22 (letter from FERC Chairman, answer to question 1.9).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. See supra text accompanying notes 93-106 (discussion of First Iowa).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
202. Freyfogle, Federal Lands and Local Communities, 27 Aiuz. L. Ra,. 653, 659 (1985);
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concerned with finding that Congress manifested a clear intent to
preempt state regulation. 23 Two types of preemption analyses are
utilized to discern congressional intent.20 The first analysis inquires
whether Congress evidenced an intent to occupy the entire legislative
field by means of a pervasive scheme of federal regulation.205 The
second test analyzes whether the state law conflicts with the federal
law in such a way as to present an obstacle to fulfilling the purposes
and objectives intended2°6 by Congress. Preemption is not presumed,
but instead requires a balancing approach much like that used in
commerce clause analysis.2 7
To the extent that exempt projects have to comply with federal
requirements under the First Iowa reasoning, comparable state require-
ments might be preempted. 2°5 To obtain an exemption, an applicant
has to comply with various resource protection proceduresM9 and
compliance with any conditions to protect instream flows. 210 If First
Iowa applies, compliance with these resource protection requirements
would preempt any similar state environmental regulation if the state
regulation could create a veto power over the project. 211
The national goal of developing domestic small-scale renewable
energy is within the commerce clause authority of the federal govern-
ment and prohibitive state regulations could frustrate such national
policy. 2 12 If the projects that are exempt from federal licensing are
Whittaker, supra note 14, at 170. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107
S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
203. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1987).
Freyfogle, supra note 202, at 659.
204. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. J. NoWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoumN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.3 (1986).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
209. 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.92, 4.107 (1986). Among the procedures for resource protection are
compliance with any requirements that the National Marine Fisheries Service, United States
Fish and Wildlife Service and analogous state agencies might impose, and meeting requirements
under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). Id.
210. 18 C.F.R. § 4.106 (1986). But see Sher Statement, supra note 21 (FERC has not
monitored or enforced license conditions such as instream flow requirements); Position of
WSWC, supra note 7. Montana is concerned that FERC granted an exemption with conditions
placed on the exemption for the maintenance of instream flows. Montana maintains that the
condition was set without regard for state law regarding instream flows. This raises the question
of who is to be responsible for assuring the maintenance of the instream flows. The State of
Washington has also had problems with FERC relating to instream flows, because FERC
(unlike Washington) does not consider nonfishery uses when determining reservations for
instream flows. Id.
211. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
212. Plouffe, supra note 90, at 843. The FPA does not, however, guarantee that the states
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merely licensed projects in expedited form, then preemption may apply
as dictated by First Iowa and subsequent cases.213 Any changes in the
preemption analysis that might result from a broad reading of section
27, as suggested by California v. United States, would also apply. 214
State regulations that clearly conflict with congressional directives
would be preempted by the federal legislation. 25
The exempt projects are not, however, equivalent to licensed projects
in short form. Since they are exempt from federal licensing require-
ments of the FPA, these small projects should not acquire the benefits
of the licensed projects. 21 6 While the application for an exemption may
implicate some federal regulations, federal regulation is not so thor-
ough as to justify preemption. 21 7 Because these projects are exempt
from the federal licensing obligations, state licensing would not create
a "dual licensing" problem as was the case in First Iowa.28 The
developer of an exempt project does not obtain any power of federal
eminent domain,2 1 9 so the developer cannot condemn existing water
rights.m Therefore, the states should be able to regulate a small,
federally exempt project by means of the appropriative right permit
when no water is available.Y2
The conclusion that Congress truly meant to create exemptions that
would have no power of federal preemption is certainly reasonable.2n
The legislative histories of PURPA and the ESA indicate that Congress
simply intended to expedite the development of small hydro projects.22
There is no indication of congressional intent to preempt state laws.
DEFERENCE TO STATE WATER LAWS
Congress has the constitutional authority through the commerce
clause22 and the supremacy clause2 to occupy the entire field of
will carry equal burdens. In fact, a study of small renewable energy development shows that
California is the definitive leader in such development. Hydroelectric development was found
in 18 states. California is ranked second in hydro development, Louisiana is ranked first.
Fenn, supra note 75, at 27.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 93-106.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 126-40.
215. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978).
216. Comment, supra note 8, at 1207 n.136.
217. Freyfogle, supra note 202, at 664 n.60 (federal agency permit process possesses
preemptive weight only if the state and local concerns are fully and fairly considered).
218. Arnold, supra note 90, at 10,142.
219. 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
220. City of Centralia v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 799 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1986);
Small Hydro, supra note 22 (letter from FERC Chairman, answer to question 1.9).
221. Small Hydro, supra note 22 (letter from FERC Chairman, answer to qestion 1.9).
222. Arnold, supra note 90, at 10,142.
223. Small Hydra, supra note 22 (letter from FERC Chairman, answer to question 1.9).
224. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
225. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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hydroelectric power. The pertinent policy question, however, is whether
Congress should assert that authority.? The broad category of "small-
scale renewable energy projects" does not represent a significant
amount of the nation's overall energy supply.2 7 The projects account
"for less than one-half of one per cent of total generating capacity."
' ' 8
The fact that small hydroelectric power projects contribute miniscule
amounts to the total energy needs of the nation provides support for
the argument that the impact on interstate commerce is not substan-
tial.29 While a finding of substantial impact is not invariably necessary
to current commerce clause jurisprudence,2 0 a ninth circuit case held
that a substantial effect on interstate commerce was essential to an
analysis of the jurisdiction of FERC.231
As one commentator has noted, FERC should be encouraged to
decline jurisdiction over the small projects?22 The promotion of small
hydroelectric projects could be better achieved through cooperation
between the state and federal government. 3 Additionally, the purpose
of the FPA is to promote the development of hydroelectric power,
not mandate its use. 4
The states, by means of existing water regulations, are in a better
position than FERC to enforce restrictions placed on small hydroelec-
tric projects?35 The imposition of conditions by FERC to protect
instream flows creates problems because it is not clear whether the
state or federal government has the authority and responsibility to
226. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALnF. L. REv 638,
652-53 (1957).
227. See Fenn, supra note 75, at 24. First Iowa involved a project that would produce
more than 150 megawatts. The projects that are exempt from federal licensing are less than
five megawatts and do not produce power as consistently as large projects.
228. Fenn, supra note 75, at 24. The 0.5% figure consists of not only hydroelectric power,
but geothermal, solar thermal, wind, biomass, and photovoltaic power as well. Id. at 27.
229. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 310-14
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
230. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 325 (1981).
231. City of Centralia v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 661 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1981). A
local activity that belongs to a class of activities that has a cumulative effect on interstate
commerce may fall within the commerce power. The effect on the national interest must be
"real and substantial." Id. at 791.
232. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 881-82. FERC has declined jurisdiction in one case. See
Comment, supra note 90, at 111. See also City of Centralia, 661 F.2d at 791 (evidence
concerning electricity produced by hydro facility did not support finding of real and substantial
effect on interstate commerce); Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 681
F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1982) (FERC without licensing jurisdiction over Truckee River because
river held not to be navigable water of the United States).
233. See Wolfe, supra note 2, at 886-87.
234. Whittaker, supra note 14, at 185.
235. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1410 (West 1971) (hearing; notice; grounds for
revocation of permit).
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enforce the conditions.2 6 Although allowing the states to impose
licensing requirements may appear to be contrary to congressional
intent, the states are better able to assess and monitor hydroelectric
projects.2 7 The effects of the small projects are primarily local in
nature and adverse effects of the projects are experienced primarily at
the local level.28 The regulatory scheme under the FPA should preempt
state law, as one commentator has argued, only when the federal
license determination is based on detailed, site specific determina-
tions.239 The state interest is substantial and state law should not be
preempted unless it is truly duplicative or there is a strong, overriding
national interest.m While state regulation of exempt projects may
"significantly hamper" congressional intent to expedite the develop-
ment of hydro power, Congress did not intend to expedite the devel-
opment by removing both state and federal regulation of small federally
exempt projects. 241
Recent legislation may mean an end to the race to develop small
hydroelectric power projects. 242 By amending section 4(e) of the FPA,
the Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA) makes clear
that "equal consideration is to be given to the purposes of energy
conservation and environmental values, including fish and wildlife
and recreation, in deciding whether to issue the license for power
and developmental purposes. ' 243 A new section has been added,
section 10(j), which guarantees that fish and wildlife agencies must
be consulted during the licensing process. 24
236. Position of WSWC, supra note 7. See also Sher Statement, supra note 21 (increasing
public perception that compliance monitoring and enforcement by FERC is lax).
237. For example, in a California case, FERC determined, that no environmental impact
statement was necessary under National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The state has
been unable to obtain sufficient information to determine whether the project complies with
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because the developer maintains that the
determination regarding NEPA preempts any requirements under CEQA. State Board, supra
note 109.
238. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1205-07 (effects of FPA preemption on state water
systems).
239. Freyfogle, supra note 202, at 664 n.60.
240. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 896.
241. See generally Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100
Stat. 1249 (1986); Tulalip Tribes v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 270 (1985). See also Sacramento Bee, Feb. 10, 1987, at B3,
col. 5 (quoting member of State Water Resources Control Board as stating that hydro
development will be "essentially unregulated" if state laws are preempted).
242. Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1249 (1986).
243. Id. at § 3(b)(2).
244. Id. at § 3(c). If, after attempting to resolve inconsistencies among agencies, FERC
does not adopt any condition recommended by a consulting agency, FERC must publish an
explanation for rejecting the condition.
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The ECPA did not, however, change much of the law regarding
exemptions. The act did include the National Marine Fisheries Service
in the list of agencies that must be consulted and which has the
power to set conditions on the exemptions. 245 The exemption for
manmade conduits was changed to allow forty megawatt facilities to
qualify, provided the conduit is used only for municipal water
supply.246 The act further amended PURPA to allow fees to be
charged for the fish and wildlife studies. 247
The changes made by the ECPA to the licensing laws reflect
congressional concern for both the environment and state authority.
Congress made substantial changes limiting the application of PURPA
benefits.2 49 The act makes clear that the PURPA incentives were
intended to apply to hydro projects utilizing existing dams. 250 The
act also recognizes state authority to protect a waterway from a
project built with PURPA incentives if the state determines that the
waterway would be adversely affected by such development. 251
CONCLUSION
Hydroelectric power is an attractive alternative to nuclear or fossil
fuel, because it is relatively clean and is generated from a renewable
resource. To avoid the local disruption caused by small hydropower
facilities, FERC regulations should thoroughly consider the local
issues. Federal preemption of state regulatory action should not be
applied to state water laws because the small hydro projects do not
implicate a strong national interest. Since Congress has not evidenced
a clear intent to preempt, state regulation of water law should be
fully recognized.
An examination of the FPA indicates that Congress was concerned
with controlling large private interests from likely interference with
the navigable waters of the nation. The PURPA amendments to the
FPA were designed to facilitate the development of clean and renew-
able forms of domestic energy. The FPA does not appear to preclude
states from regulating water rights for small hydroelectric projects.
245. Id. § 7(b).
246. Id. § 7(a).
247. Id. § 7(c).
248. H.R. 934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
249. Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, § 3(b)(2), 100 Stat.
1249 (1986).
250. Id.
251. Id. § 8(a).
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First Iowa however presents formidable precedent against states wishing
to regulate hydro power.
Water is a unique resource and has traditionally been left to state regula-
tion. California v. United States reinforces the principle of deference
to state water rights and should be applied to hydro power. The small
projects, particularly the exempt projects, are best left to state control.
Wendy M. Fisher
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